Empirical evidence shows that longer spells of unemployment are associated with lower jobfinding rates and entry wages. This paper addresses the question of whether and, if so, to what extent a stigma mechanism amplifies the effects of ex-ante heterogeneity on the reemployment prospects of workers. We build a directed search model in which workers are ex-ante heterogeneous and firms search is non-sequential. There is symmetric incomplete information on the productivity of workers, yet firms imperfectly screen candidates. Because skilled workers perform better at the recruiting stage, longer durations signal lower expected productivities and firms rank candidates by duration in equilibrium. Hazard rates decline with unemployment duration because of both heterogeneity and stigma. According to our calibration, ex-ante heterogeneity accounts for at least two thirds of the decline of hazard rates of US youth, whereas entry wages fall would be approximately three times larger if stigma were absent.
Introduction
It is well documented that the workers' reemployment and wage prospects deteriorate the longer they are unemployed. 1 At least since Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984) , the empirical literature has emphasized the effects of ex-ante (unobserved) heterogeneity on duration dependence of the hazard rates. As Heckman (1991) puts it, a crucial question to understand the dynamics of the reemployment outcomes is to ascertain whether and to what extent the market forces amplify the negative duration effects due to the ex-ante differences. To address this question, we build a directed search model in which ex-ante heterogeneity across workers, firms' non-sequential search and their preferences for relatively more productive workers generate stigma.
One important contribution of our work is to highlight the intertwined dynamics of hazard rates and entry wages.
To be specific, we consider an economy with symmetric incomplete information on the market productivity of job-seekers. Firms have access to an imperfect screening technology, however.
Under the assumption that skilled workers perform better at the interview time, unemployment duration conveys information on the expected productivity of the job-seekers. The composition effect is enhanced if firms meet several candidates at once because then they discriminate among applicants according to their expected productivity and make contingent wage offers in equilibrium. Hazard rates thus decline with unemployment duration because of both heterogeneity and the ranking recruiting strategies (stigma). Equilibrium wages capture the marginal value of the candidate relative to the other applicants. Although all the simulating work shows declining wages, unfortunately we cannot prove this result.
To quantitatively assess the relative importance of the amplification stigma mechanism, we calibrate the model to the US economy. Despite that the model is fairly stylized, it fits quite well the distributions of hazard rates and entry wages over unemployment duration. The empirical distributions are estimated using 1994-2008 data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The dataset is restricted to job-seekers aged below 30 mainly for stronger consistency with the symmet-1 Machin and Manning (1999) show for the US that a 10% increase in unemployment duration reduces the jobfinding hazard rate by 4.5%. Using European panel data, Addison, Portugal, and Centeno (2004) estimate the marginal effect of duration on the arrival rate of job offers at -0.131. Keane and Wolpin (1997) find that blue-collar workers experience a wage drop by 9.6% after one year of unemployment, whereas white-collar workers' wages are reduced by 36.5%. ric incomplete information assumption. We use the calibrated parameter values to compare the distributions of the described economy with their counterparts in the alternative setting with no stigma. We obtain that ex-ante heterogeneity accounts for at least two thirds of the hazard rate fall. This is largely in line with the empirical literature. For example, van den Berg and van Ours (1996) conclude that the declining pattern of the hazard rates is mostly due to the unobserved heterogeneity across job-seekers, except for white males. van den Berg and van Ours (1994) find similar findings for French and Dutch workers, and obtain strong individual duration dependence for British males.
The flip side of the outcome on hazard rates is the dynamics of entry wages. As expected, limiting the strategy space of the firms by eliminating the ranking behavior yields higher employment chances at almost all durations. As a result, the average skills of the representative job-seeker deteriorate more rapidly and so do the entry wages. Without the stigma mechanism, entry wages would then fall by 70%, instead of 20%. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work on the relative importance of stigma effects on entry wages.
How firms' recruiting decisions depend on the candidates' unemployment duration has been studied by Oberholzer-Gee (2008) in a field experiment and a survey conducted in Switzerland. He reports that the recruiting practices discriminate against candidates with longer durations and the main reason given by the surveyed firms is that long spells are indicative of a number of rejections at previous job interviews. 2 This paper is not the first studying rational stigma based on information.
Indeed, we borrow the screening technology from Vishwanath (1989) and Lockwood (1991) . The former is a partial equilibrium model in which the focus is on the supply side and state dependence is imposed. The key departure from the random-search-and-wage-bargaining model of the latter is twofold: first, firms post wages to attract workers and, second, meetings are multilateral. To gain tractability, Lockwood (1991) assumes that workers have no bargaining power and hence are paid their home productivity in equilibrium provided it exists. Therefore, entry wages are constant in duration. Declining job-finding rates in turn obtain relying on two fairly restrictive 2 Genda, Kondo, and Ohta (2010) find persistent negative effects of the unemployment rate on employment prospects at high-school graduation for Japanese men. The Japanese school-based hiring system is pointed out to be responsible for this result. The stigma mechanism is similar to the one posed in this paper: recruiters discriminate in favor of candidates recently graduated from high school. Further, this mechanism is not limited to labor markets. It may apply to other markets where it is difficult to evaluate quality, and time on the market is informative.
For example, searchers in the housing market may be less interested in ads that have been posted for a long time.
assumptions. First, the unskilled workers' home productivity is above their market outcome to ensure that detected unskilled workers are not hired leading to a standard composition effect.
Second, workers' search is costless. Otherwise, workers would stay out of the labor force because they would still expect to be paid their home productivity due to lack of commitment on the part of the firm. These two assumptions guarantee that the average (but not the individual) hazard rate declines mechanically with duration. In addition, firms use unemployment duration as a signal of the applicant's quality and set a threshold that delimits employability.
Ranking of job applicants by unemployment duration has first been introduced by Blanchard and Diamond (1994) . 3 They study a random search model where firms rank job candidates by assumption and wages are continuously bargained over. Since meetings are bilateral, the worker's and firm's disagreement points are the asset value of a newly unemployed and a vacancy, respectively. This makes the equilibrium wages independent of unemployment duration. 4 Although they also compare the ranking equilibrium with its non-ranking counterpart, workers are homogeneous ex-ante and hazard rates do not fall with duration if ranking is absent. As in their case, long-term unemployed workers have little effect on the entry wages of their short-term counterparts in our setting. This is the case because workers are rewarded according to their marginal value with respect to the other candidates and the long-term unemployed are weighted very little in this assessment.
Symmetric incomplete information on the market productivity of the applicants is a crucial assumption to prevent them from self-selecting in different markets. 5 This assumption is also central in Gonzalez and Shi (2009) . They study a competitive search framework where meetings are bilateral and workers are equally productive, but differ in their matching ability. The matching ability is non-observable to workers themselves, yet they learn about it by searching in a segmented labor market. Continuing unemployed one more period makes workers search for lower wage jobs, which are easier to obtain. However, there is a composition effect similar to the one in our model that reduces the average matching ability of the pool of job-seekers over time. Whether hazard rates decline with duration depends on which of the two effects dominate. In contrast to Gonzalez and Shi (2009) , we analyze an economy in which meetings are multilateral and firms design a menu 3 Moen (1999) constructs a ranking model by education showing that human capital investments prior to matching are undertaken not only to raise future wages, but also employment prospects.
4 As the authors argue, assuming human capital depreciation would deliver an endogenous reason for firms to rank and declining wages. 5 See Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) for an analysis with directed search and asymmetric information.
of wages. As a result, all firms post the same wage offers and find it optimal to employ all types of workers because they can discriminate among them in equilibrium. 6
Multilateral meetings is a distinct feature of our setting with respect to the bilateral meeting technology in the papers cited above. That is, firms' search is non-sequential herein. The notable differences with respect to Gonzalez and Shi (2009) show that this is far from being a innocuous assumption. Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg (1985) report that recruiting employers interviewed at least six applicants prior to filling a position according to the 1980 Employer Opportunity Pilot Project survey. Using Dutch establishment data, van Ours and Ridder (1992) conclude that firms' search is non-sequential, unlike workers' search. Abbring and van Ours (1994) test and confirm this extent also using data for Netherlands.
Beyond the differences in goals, we largely benefitted from Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a) since they pioneered in introducing heterogeneity into a (static) directed search model. In contrast to Shimer (2005a) , we show that the equilibrium is not constrained efficiency as firms do not internalize the effects on next period's expected productivity when posting wages.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents CPS data on the labor market outcomes under consideration.
In Section 3, we analyze the benchmark economy, and characterize the equilibrium.
Section 4 calibrates an extended model to the US economy. Section 5 shuts down the ranking channel and assets its importance. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Data
This section looks at data on hazard rates and entry wages from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly US survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We make use of the limited longitudinal aspect of this dataset to keep track of the employment status of the interviewed agents as well as learn the entry wages from unemployment. Interviewees also report their unemployment duration in weeks. The time period under analysis is 1994-2008. The pool of observations is briefly speaking restricted to non-farming and non-public-sector individuals of age 20 to 30 who were unemployed and actively seeking a job at the previous month. We obtain 19165 observations of individuals' employment status and 3787 for hourly wages corresponding to the outgoing rotation groups. The Appendix section contains further descriptive details of our dataset.
6 Learning by searching is also present in our setting as workers update their expectations on their own productivity over time despite the fact that they do not search in different submarkets as time passes.
We follow closely the analysis by Addison, Portugal, and Centeno (2004) of the European hazard rates and entry wages. First, we use a probit specification to estimate the dependence of the probability of transiting from unemployment to employment at a monthly frequency on a quartic polynomial of the unemployment duration. We control for a number of observables, which include for example education, imputed experience, gender, monthly and yearly dummies as well as industry and occupation dummies. Then, we compute the estimated hazard rates at each duration by replacing the remaining variables at their means. Figure 1(a) shows the data distribution for hazard rates by duration. Duration dependence is particularly severe for short spells, with the hazard rate declining by approximately 50% after 10 weeks and smoothing out from then on. Second, CPS distinguishes between hourly wages and weekly earnings. Due to issues concerning the measurement of working-time, we focus on before-tax-and-deductions hourly wages, which exclude overtime pay, tips, and commissions. Hourly wages are deflated by the monthly CPI. The literature has identified two main data problems: the simultaneity of the determination of entry wages and unemployment duration, and a sample selection issue due to the fact that the information provided by the job-seekers failing to find a job would be missing in a standard regression. We then estimate by 2SLS a Mincerian regression of log hourly wages considering the log of unemployment duration as endogenous and instrumenting it by a number of variables such as household size, the metropolitan area size and the job-finding method. The elasticity of the log hourly wages with respect to the log of duration is statistically significant and amounts to -0.0618. Again, we can determine the estimated hourly wages at each duration by replacing the other variables by their means. To compare the actual data with the data simulated from our model, we report the distribution of wages normalized by the wage obtained by the newly employed with duration one week. Because of the logs and the normalization, we are left with the following relationship w(τ ) = τ −0.0618 . Figure 1 (b) shows that entry wages fall by 13% after 10 weeks of unemployment.
Model
This section presents a directed search model in line with the empirical evidence. The four key features of this economy are symmetric incomplete information on workers' market productivity, multilateral meetings, multi-wage contracts and imperfect screening by firms.
Environment
Time is discrete. A unit measure of unemployed workers and a continuum of identical firms enter the labor market every period. The mass of new firms is determined by free entry. All agents are risk neutral and discount future payoffs at a common rate β. Workers are hit by an idiosyncratic death shock with probability δ > 0 every period.
Unemployed workers are identified by a pair (τ, i). The variable τ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T } denotes their elapsed duration of unemployment. Job-seekers leave the labor market after T periods. The symbol i ∈ {l, h} stands for their ability or productivity level y i , with y h > y l ≡ b, where b is the home productivity. Type i is drawn at birth by Nature. A worker is born high-skilled with probability µ. 7 Let u i (τ ) denote the measure of unemployed workers of type (τ, i) at the beginning of a given period. As a result of the Law of Large Numbers, a mass u h (1) = µ of newborn workers are high-skilled. The two-dimensional unemployment distribution u ≡ (u i (τ )) i,τ is the aggregate state variable in this economy. The focus of this paper is on the steady-state allocation; hence, time indices are suppressed.
At the beginning of every period, workers can be either employed or unemployed. The unemployed seek job opportunities and derive utility from home production. The employed produce according to their type, and consume their wage. Employment is an absorbing state except for the idiosyncratic death shocks. 8 Firms in turn can be either active or vacant. Each firms is identified 7 We will refer to type h workers as high-ability, high-skilled or skilled indistinctly. Analogously for type l agents 8 If displaced workers did not leave the labor market, workers would differ not only by their last unemployment spell, but also by their whole employment history. This would provide firms and workers with additional information about candidates' productivity. Further, the economy would turn to one with asymmetric information as workers would learn about their productivity in their past jobs. Likewise, if firm-initiated layoffs were considered, the length of the past employment spells would also be informative to potential recruiters. These extensions complicate the with one job. Active firms employ one worker until the arrival of a death shock to his employee. Then, they vanish. By posting a vacancy, vacant firms incur recruitment cost k. Recruiting firms may receive multiple applications, test candidates and select at most one employee for their vacancies.
Information and Screening Technology. Whereas unemployment duration of any given candidate is public information, there is symmetric incomplete information on the actual productivity of the worker. That is, worker's productivity is unobservable to both the worker herself and potential employers. Seeking firms may imperfectly screen job candidates at no cost, however. The unskilled applicant passes the test with probability λ l = λ, a false negative. For simplicity, skilled applicants are assumed to always succeed at the test, λ h = 1. 9 We assume that the test information is not verifiable and cannot be traded. Thus, neither workers nor other firms have access to the test results and only learn the hiring decision.
The expected productivity of the successful type τ candidates is therefore determined by
whereas the actual productivity of the selected applicant is instantaneously revealed upon hiring.
Timing. Before describing the remaining details of the economy, the following outlines the timing of events within each period:
1. A unit mass of unemployed workers and a continuum of firms enter the labor market.
2. Vacant firms post job offers at cost k.
3. Workers direct their search and submit at most one application.
4. Matching process takes place: Workers take the test, and firms select at most one candidate.
algebra without adding much to our story. See e.g. Gibbons and Katz (1991) and ? for a theoretical and empirical analysis of these extensions. 9 Costless screening is assumed for simplicity. With convex screening costs satisfying the Inada conditions, it can be shown that screening takes place in equilibrium and the main results do not change. If λ = 0, the screening would be perfect. Imperfectness of applicant screening is widely supported by the human resource management literature.
See e.g. Arvey and Campion (1982) . The normalization λ h = 1 is assumed for tractability. The relevant assumption is that skilled workers are more likely to pass the test than the unskilled.
5. Successful job-seekers start producing according to their productivity, which is revealed upon hiring, and consume their income.
6. Unmatched workers remain unemployed and consume b, whereas unfilled vacancies disappear.
7. Idiosyncratic death shocks hit workers, and unemployed of duration T leave the labor market.
Contracting Space. Recruiting firms commit to a contractual job offer and job-seekers direct their search after observing all offers. Let w = {w τ } τ ∈T be an offered contract, which may stipulate wages contingent on expected productivities. We use duration subindices as a shorthand way to refer to expected productivities as expression (1) establishes a mapping between unemployment duration and expected productivity. 10 We do not allow for wages contingent on ex-ante unobservables such as the ex-post revealed actual productivity or the outcome of the matching process (that is, e.g., how many applications the firm received of each type). We think of those events as unverifiable by a third party and therefore non-enforceable. As is common in directed search models, wage offers price waiting time. In this economy, firms set a menu of wages not only to trade off higher wages with a higher rate of applications (extensive margin), but also to attract candidates of higher productivity (intensive margin).
Optimal Selection Rule. Seeking employers may receive several applications. Recruiters use the screening technology to discriminate among candidates. Due to the simplifying assumptions that a low-ability worker is perfectly detected if a test failure occurs and that unskilled workers are not employable because of y l = b, passing the test is a necessary condition for a worker to be shortlisted. 11 Firms set a selection rule σ, which ranks workers' types according to their corresponding expected profitability. Firms are assumed to randomize among ex-ante equally productive candidates of the same cohort. Further, if two different cohorts had the same expected profitability, then the younger cohort would be ranked ahead. Formally, for any τ, τ ∈ {1, ..., T },
10 Firms might commit to a continuous wage scheme as a function of expected productivity. Since only a finite number of productivities hold in equilibrium given the state variable, there are infinitely many contracts that are indeed equivalent. 11 The assumption y l = b is made for tractability reasons, unlike in Lockwood (1991) . Otherwise, if y l > b, unskilled workers would be employable and firms would randomize among candidates provided none passed the test.
where J τ (w, u) stands for the firm's expected discounted value upon filling the vacancy with a worker of duration τ . The optimal permutation σ depends on the state variable as it pins down the expected productivity distribution as in (1). Given the state variable u, the permutation is thus bijective.
Because of our interest in equilibria in which firms optimally rank candidates by unemployment duration and for expositional simplicity, we impose hereafter the following selection rule: σ(τ ; u) = τ . Later on, Lemma 3.3 states that this assumption is consistent with a profit-maximizing behavior of firms.
Learning, Search and Matching. Workers and firms come together via search. Firms post jobs offers and workers direct their search. Job-seekers update their beliefs about their own expected productivity. Put differently, they learn from searching a more accurate estimate of it. Likewise, a worker who has been unemployed for τ periods expects to succeed at the test with probability
Workers of the same duration use identical mixed-application strategies, which is a natural assumption when looking at equilibrium with a continuum of agents. In other words, by ruling out coordinating strategies, coordination frictions arise and guarantee the coexistence of unemployment and vacancies. To be more specific, the matching process relies on the urn-ball scheme. Meetings are multilateral: some urns (i.e. posted vacancies) receive several balls (i.e. applications), whereas some others receive none. Only one ball per urn can be selected. As a result, some workers and firms are matched, and the remaining seekers stay unemployed and vacant.
Each firm posting job w expects q τ (w, u) applicants of duration τ . To simplify notation we will omit the dependence of q on the contract w and the state variable u hereafter unless needed for clarity. Define q τ ≡ (q, q 2 , ..., q τ ). For each firm, the probability of filling a job w with a type τ worker is
The first factor of this expression stands for the probability that no worker better placed than a candidate of type τ either applies to the firm or, if applied, performs well in the test. 12 Whereas the second term is the probability that the firm receives at least one application from the cohort τ . Note that this expression captures both a firm's ranking strategy and the fact that unsuccessful workers at the test are never hired. Since it must be the case that the measure of matched workers and firms of each type coincide, we obtain
Therefore, the job-finding probability for a given type τ worker conditional on applying to job w and passing the test is
The actual matching probability for a worker of type τ is defined as
The hazard rate of workers has two components. The dynamics of the first factor capture how the composition of the pool of unemployed evolve over time and eventually depend on the entry of firms in the economy. The second term incorporates the firms' ranking strategies. As a result, if duration dependence of hazard rates takes place in equilibrium, it relies on both sorting and state dependence.
Value Functions. Let us proceed with the value functions for workers and firms. An employed worker derives utility from wages until worker's death takes place. Her value function is defined by
where α = 1 1−β(1−δ) considers the discount factor as well as the survival probability. An unemployed worker of duration τ has market value U τ (u). She may apply to any posted job offer w and then become employed with probability h τ (u, q τ (u, w)) obtaining value E τ (w).
Otherwise, she produces b at home and remains unemployed one more period. To determine the assigned to contract w by type i workers of duration τ :
queue length q τ (w, u), and hence the optimal search behavior of job-seekers, the directed search equilibrium concept imposes an indifference condition, which resembles subgame perfection. That is, type τ workers apply to job w if the expected value derived from w equates their market value.
Otherwise, if below, they do not apply to type w jobs and q τ (w, u) = 0. The following equilibrium condition summarizes it: (9) and q τ (w, u) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
Now, a firm that has offered contract w and has filled its vacancy with a type τ worker receives worker's productivity net of wages till the arrival of a death shock. Its value function is defined by:
A firm posting vacancy w incurs a recruitment cost k and fills the job with a type τ candidate with probability η τ (q τ (w, u)). The corresponding value function of a vacancy is defined by
Equilibrium
Now, we define the recursive equilibrium in the steady state.
Definition 1 A steady state recursive equilibrium consists of value functions
and an expected queue length function
i) Given Q and u, the value functions satisfy the above Bellman equations (8)- (11).
ii) Firms' profit maximization and zero-profit condition.
-Given u and w, the selection rule σ(τ ; u) = τ satisfies condition (2).
-Given (U τ ) τ , Q and u, w is the profit-maximizing contract, and expected profits become zero at w:
iii) Workers direct their search.
∀w ∈ [0, y h ] T and ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T }, Q τ (w , u) satisfies the complementary slackness condition (9).
iv) Recursivity condition.
Let q τ ≡ Q τ (w, u). The distribution of workers recursively satisfies
with u h (1) = µ and u l (1) = 1 − µ.
v) Resource constraints:
, ∀τ ∈ {2, ..., T }.
Firms maximize profits, which drop down to zero in equilibrium because of free entry. The third equilibrium condition is required to pin down rational expectations on queue lengths out of the equilibrium. This subgame perfection condition determines the expected queue length for any given contract attractive to workers by making them indifferent between the equilibrium contract and this other offer.
The aggregate state variable u is endogenous and is determined by the history of all agents' equilibrium decisions. The Law of Large Numbers ensures that u i (τ )λ i ν τ (q τ ) type i workers of duration τ become employed and a fraction δ of the remaining die at the end of the period.
Thus, the fourth condition determines the law of motion for the state variable. Finally, the set of constraints (13) ensures that for each τ the number of applications sent, u h (τ ) + λu l (τ ), equals the number of applications received, q τ v, where v stands for the mass of vacancies posted in equilibrium.
By manipulating such equations and substituting v out, the system (13) obtains.
Equilibrium Characterization.
Competitive and directed search models with heterogeneous workers often offer a tractable environment due to the so-called block-recursivity. That is, as first stated by Shi (2009) in an economy with on-the-job search, the workers' search decisions and the optimal contracts posted by firms are independent of the distribution of workers, our state variable. This is not the case in our setting due to the assumption of multilateral meetings together with the possibility for firms to select among heterogeneous candidates, however. Firms post a menu of wages considering the entire distribution of expected productivities, which derives from the distribution of workers, as they may end up filling their vacancies with any type of worker. Workers in turn base their search decisions on the mass of workers of each duration shorter than theirs because of firms ranking strategies. The no block-recursivity feature makes the equilibrium characterization more cumbersome. However, the equilibrium conditions stated below may be seen as a dynamic variation of Shimer's (2005a) equilibrium equations.
We start with the profit maximization problem of a representative firm. For any given pair
That is, the firm chooses the pair (w, q T ) that maximizes its profits anticipating the relationship between wages and queue lengths due to the optimal search behavior of workers. The restrictions are indeed the complementary slackness equilibrium conditions (9). The following proposition
shows that there exists a unique solution to this program and, as a result, there is only one market in equilibrium. We also show that firms find it optimal to employ all types of workers. After replacing wages using the market value condition, the resulting profit function is continuous, twice differentiable and its hessian is negative definite. Therefore, the first order conditions are also sufficient and all firms choose the same contract and queue lengths. Moreover, given that the expected productivity at any duration is strictly above the home productivity, firms always find it profitable to offer wages to all potential candidates. By doing so, firms increase their job-filling probability and incur no extra cost because of the ranking strategies. 13
13 We discuss in Section 5 why recruiting all types of workers is not an optimal strategy when firms are not allowed to rank candidates. Briefly, if firms randomize among candidates, the expected profits lower when adding less productive candidates to the pool of applicants because of a lower expected productivity and a higher wage cost necessary to compensate the more productive applicants for their lower employment chances. Now, to characterize the equilibrium allocation, let f : [0, 1] 2×T ×R T + → [0, 1] 2×T ×R T + be defined as the composite correspondence f ≡ φ • ψ, where φ and ψ are defined as follows. First, given u and
is defined as the set of triples (w, q T , (U τ ) τ ) that satisfy the system of resource constraints (13), the zero-profit condition and solve the firms' profit maximization program (14).
Second, let φ be a function defined as φ(w, q T , (U τ ) τ ) ≡ (ũ, (Ũ τ ) τ ), whereũ is uniquely determined by the equilibrium recursivity condition (12), andŨ τ = U τ for all τ . The following proposition states that the equilibrium allocation can be identified with the solution of a fixed point problem.
Proposition 3.2 Any equilibrium allocation (u, w, (U τ ) τ , q T ) is a fixed point of correspondence f .
Conversely, a fixed point of f is an equilibrium allocation.
Furthermore, there exists a steady state equilibrium, which is characterized by the recursivity condition (12), the resource constraints (13) and the following set of conditions:
where
We show that the correspondence f is indeed a continuous function. Furthermore, since unemployed workers stay in the labor market for up to T periods, the domain of f is of finite dimension.
Hence, Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem applies to show existence of a fixed point and thereby existence of equilibrium. 14 Although the computational work suggests uniqueness of equilibrium, we cannot prove it analytically. The equilibrium equation (16) corresponds to the first order condition with respect to the queue lengths in the firm's problem (14). Equilibrium equation (15) is obtained by plugging (16) into the zero-profit condition. The equilibrium wages are determined by manipulating the market value conditions using (16).
14 A frequent question is whether there is no a profitable deviation that targets only a subset of types of workers since they are discriminated against according to the ranking recruiting strategies. Since the equilibrium wages and queue lengths must solve problem (14), which allows for the q τ = 0 case, any such a deviation cannot be profitable.
In search models, workers are paid a share of the joint surplus on top of their unemployment value. In directed and competitive search models, the worker's share is determined in equilibrium as the elasticity of the job-filling probability, which is the fraction in the first term of the equation (17). In our setting with multilateral meetings, it can also be interpreted as the probability that the applicant of duration τ is the only one from his cohort conditional on the firm receiving at least one application of that type. This term is multiplied by this worker's expected productivity net of both her continuation value as unemployed and the net expected output derived from any other potential match. In other words, workers are rewarded according to their marginal value relative to the next best alternative. Notice that if there were another type τ applicant, the marginal value of the worker would be zero. Since contractual offers cannot be made contingent on the number of applications received, firms commit to the expected marginal value of the applicant by averaging over these two events. As Shimer (2005a) and others have pointed out, the wage equilibrium equals the expected wage a worker would obtain if the firm auction off the job by using a second-price, sealed bid auction.
Properties of the Equilibrium.
Now, we provide the rationale for an equilibrium with ranking by unemployment duration to exist.
The equilibrium selection rule σ(τ ; u) = τ implies a positive relationship between profitability and expected productivity, and a negative one between the latter and unemployment duration, which hinges on an informational externality.
The following lemma states that the expected productivity falls with unemployment duration regardless of what recruiting strategies (other than screening) firms choose. For any given cohort, the pool of job-seekers deteriorates over time as better candidates are more likely to be hired. 15
Duration is informative about the applicant's productivity because unemployment is indicative of potential failures at the previous screening stages. Thus, firms and workers form rational expectations on applicants' productivity based on their unemployment duration in equilibrium. Furthermore, it holds that the most profitable worker is the most productive one in equilibrium. As a result, it is optimal for firms to rank candidates by their unemployment duration confirming that 15 Notice that this result relies on the focus on the steady state. It is easy to come up with examples in which the relationship between the expected productivity and duration is not monotone, although duration dependence holds overall.
our selection rule is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior. This recruiting strategy is supported by the empirical evidence given in Oberholzer-Gee (2008) . We refer to it as an informational stigma equilibrium.
Lemma 3.3 Given a distribution u, y τ (u) is a decreasing function of τ provided that λ l < λ h . The value of an active firm J τ (w) declines with duration in equilibrium.
This result suggests that employment prospects of a worker also deteriorate over time. Proposition 3.4 shows that the worker's equilibrium market value, U τ , decline with duration. It also states the obvious outcome that hazard rates show the same declining pattern. This is the case because the two components of h τ are decreasing functions in τ for a given state u. First, the sorting effect reduces the probability of being skilled and, hence, passing the test, p τ , as τ increases. Second, the ranking strategies of firms make the event of becoming employed conditional on succeeding at the test less likely the longer the unemployment spell. That is, negative duration dependence is caused by both unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in our setting. This is consistent with the empirical evidence discussed above.
Proposition 3.4 The equilibrium expected returns from unemployment, U τ , and the job-finding rate, h τ , falls with duration.
Although all our numerical work shows that this negative duration dependence extends to equilibrium wages as is the case in the data, we cannot prove it analytically. The following lines attempt to give some insights in this regard. It is worth thinking first of the case in which firms are forced to randomize among applicants in a symmetric equilibrium provided that it existed. In this case, firms would set different wages for different observable characteristics so that the marginal returns of filling the vacancies were equal across durations. That is,ȳ τ (u)−w τ would be constant in τ . Since productivity would fall due to the sorting mechanism, so would entry wages. The question is then whether ranking strategies change the negative duration dependence outcome of wages.
In his static economy with two-sided heterogeneity, Shimer (2005a) argues that wages need not fall even if the (exogenously given) productivity distribution declines. The following example provides some intuition: to compensate workers of duration τ + 1 from discriminating them against the type τ applicants even though they are just epsilon less productive, wages may increase from durations τ to τ + 1. We can prove that if the expected productivityȳ τ is sufficiently convex, wages fall with duration. Contrary to Shimer (2005a) , the expected productivity distribution in this model is endogenously determined, yet we have not been able to prove that such sufficient condition holds in equilibrium.
Constrained Efficiency.
Now, we argue that a benevolent social planner can improve upon the decentralized equilibrium.
As the model is cumbersome to analyze for the general T case, we restrict the study to the T = 2 case, which we believe provides the key insights for the inefficiency result. For simplicity, we also set home productivity b = 0.
In equilibrium, after substituting wages out, the private returns of a period t vacancy are
+βαy 2,t (u t )q 2 1,t
The interpretation of (18) is straightforward. The first two terms are the expected output produced by the firm net of the vacancy cost, whereas the last two are the wage costs the firm incurs. Free entry of firms implies Π * t = 0 in equilibrium. We now turn to the centralized economy. As is standard in the literature with risk neutrality, a benevolent dictator posts a number of vacancies to maximize total output net of recruitment costs. Given workers' risk neutrality, this is equivalent to maximize the discounted expected utility of the representative worker. Furthermore, the planner must set a hiring strategy given the heterogeneity in productivity. The planner is also subject to the same constraints specified above for the decentralized economy: namely, the anonymity constraint, the incomplete information problem and the imperfect λ-screening technology. The first constraint limits the ability of the planner to assign workers to jobs. The planner tells identical workers to follow identical application strategies.
Thus, coordination frictions arise. The two other constraints ensure that the planner has no superior screening technologies relative to firms in the decentralized economy. In particular, it cannot centralize information about the testing results to record the individual workers' testing outcomes.
Each vacancy may receive a number of applications, if any, identified only by the observables (i.e. applicants' unemployment duration). Recall that low-skilled workers are as productive at home as at work; that is, they produce zero output. Passing the test is therefore also a necessary condition for employment in the centralized economy. Since skilled workers are more likely to pass the test, unemployment duration is informative on the expected productivity of the candidates. Therefore, the planner also discriminates against candidates with longer unemployment spells. The planner's problem is defined as:
where v t (q 1,t ) stands for the measure of vacancies posted in period t. The social planner opens new vacancies provided their returns are positive. LetΠ t denote the social returns of a marginal vacancy in period t. By differentiating the planner's problem with respect to v t , the social returns of the period t marginal vacancy arê
−q 1,t βα
The first two terms stand for the expected output net of vacancy costs. The third term is the standard negative externality on other period t firms as they are less likely to fill their vacancies.
When comparing to the expression (18) for private returns, we see that this effect is internalized in equilibrium as is usually the case in directed (and competitive) search models. The last term is new and corresponds to the discounted period t + 1 costs as the extra period t firm reduces the expected returns of period t + 1 firms. This intertemporal effect occurs through two channels that correspond to the two objects in this last term. First, the extensive margin: the extra period t firm reduces the mass of period t + 1 job-seekers, making it more difficult to fill period t + 1 jobs.
Second, the intensive margin: its hiring affects negatively the composition of the period t + 1 pool of unemployed and hence reduces the period t + 1 expected returns.
We compare the social and private returns of a vacancy to analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium allocation. Let their difference at any given allocation be denoted by d t ≡ Π * t −Π t . Then, we have
This difference is strictly positive provided that the test is informative, λ < 1, and the two types of workers coexist, µ ∈ (0, 1). That is, decentralized firms do not internalize the negative effects on next period output; hence, there is excessive entry of firms in equilibrium. A tax on the entry cost, or equivalently on firms' profits, would lead the decentralized economy to the social planner's allocation. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 3.5 The steady state equilibrium is not constrained efficient provided the test is informative. A tax on firms' profits or on the vacancy-posting activity leads the equilibrium to attain efficiency.
To better understand this result, it is worth looking at two extreme cases: namely, λ = 1 and λ = 0. In the former case, if the test is not informative, the equilibrium is constrained efficient. Indeed, the setup does not differ from the standard directed search model: All workers are identical, firms do not test and make decisions according to expected productivity, the actual productivity does not depend on past decisions and is realized at the matching time. That is, not only ∂y 2,t+1 (u t+1 ) ∂q 1,t = 0, but also the loss in period t + 1 output due to the marginal increase of the mass of period t vacancies is neutralized by the increase in total output in period t.
The second case, λ = 0, provides additional insights. Obviously,
there are no composition effects as firms can perfectly detect the skilled applicants. Unemployment duration is therefore worthless information. However, the equilibrium is not constrained efficient because of the asymmetric information outcome as firms have perfect information on applicants' abilities, whereas they themselves do not. To be more specific, the social planner can perfectly discriminate between workers' types. Therefore, it decides the mass of vacancies according to the right mass of type h candidates for each τ . The decentralized market equivalent to this one would be populated only by skilled workers with unskilled workers limiting themselves to stay and produce at home. Instead, in our setup workers' uncertainty about their own type plays a role. Although firms also perfectly distinguish types in our setup, they are constrained to promise a market value which is below the one in this alternative decentralized economy. As a result, there is excessive entry of firms. In other words, the forgone output in period t + 1 is larger than the welfare gains of marginally increasing the mass of vacancies in period t.
For intermediate values of λ, the inefficiency source is twofold. First, the second term in (21) is always positive suggesting again a less stringent market value condition than necessary to attain efficiency. Second, the change in period t + 1 output due to a higher queue length is now ∂y 2,t+1 (u t+1 ) ∂q 1,t > 0, an externality which is not captured by period t agents in equilibrium.
Not allowing firms to reveal or trade the testing results is an important assumption in our setting. Efficiency gains would be obtained by centralizing testing or by providing a device that releases public information on workers' abilities. Interestingly, there are real world examples. One example is the Japanese school-based hiring system. Japanese high-schools play an active role in the job-assignment of the newly graduated students as firms are forced to use schools as intermediaries to fill their vacancies. See Genda, Kondo, and Ohta (2010) for further details. This public device has two beneficial contributions. Firms benefit from the information accumulated by teachers over the years at school. Along the lines of the analysis of the inefficiency outcome in the λ = 0 case and, more specifically, of the issues concerning an asymmetric information outcome, it is also welfare-improving that the information is accessible to job-seekers, which is largely the case.
Finally, it is not obvious why public intervention is needed since there is room for a market activity of intermediation inasmuch as firms benefit from centralizing testing. This is the case of the US Temporary Help Supply (THS) industry, which has grown systematically in the 1990s accounting for 10% of employment growth in that decade, according to Autor (2001) . In addition to training and labor supply, the THS firms offer screening services. In particular, screening is relevant for one fourth of THS clients, who aim at filling permanent positions.
Calibration of Extended Model
The benchmark model of the previous section is fairly stylized. Despite that, our numerical work shows that it is sufficiently flexible to replicate the empirical distributions of hazard rates and entry wages. However, the exercise for the assessment of the stigma effect described in Section 5 suggests us to calibrate a slightly extended version of the benchmark. We first describe the few differences with respect to the model of the previous section and then move on to the calibration details.
The extended model differs from the benchmark solely in one feature: namely, the market productivity of the unskilled workers is above their home productivity, y l > b. A straightforward implication is that firms may hire workers who have failed the test. A number of consequences follow up. 16 Firms still find it optimal to fill the vacancy with the most productive candidate in 16 A more detailed determination of the equilibrium allocation can be found in the online Appendix.
equilibrium. Since wage offers can be contingent on expected productivity, a duration-independent wage conditional on failing the test is included in the posted offer. Firms anticipate that workers with short spells may find the wage offer unattractive if it is below their continuation value of unemployment; hence, firms randomize among the remaining candidates provided that no applicant passed the test. The hazard rates now becomes
where the last term ν l stands for the probability of transiting to employment conditional on failing the test. Equilibrium wages continue rewarding the marginal value of the candidate as a natural extension of their benchmark counterpart.
We now turn to describe the calibration details. We set a period to be a week and the weekly discount factor β to match a yearly interest rate of 5%. The parameter for the maximum time span searching for job, T , is set equal to 52 weeks. 17 We normalize the market productivity of the high type workers to y h ≡ 1. Using a GMM approach, we then jointly calibrate the parameters λ, µ, k, y l , b, and δ. k is chosen to equal 14% of model quarterly wages per hire (see Silva and Toledo (2009) ). The remaining parameters are chosen so that the model's normalized wage and monthly hazard rate distributions match their empirical counterparts. We compute the hazard rate from the model exactly as in the data: for a given duration τ , we add up all the workers who became newly employed over the succeeding 4-week interval and divide it by the total number of unemployed of that duration at the beginning of the 4-week interval. The wage distribution is based on 4-week moving averages, where we use the masses of newly employed workers as weights. 18 From each distribution we target 15 (equally spaced) points. To better capture the shapes of the empirical hazard rate and wage distributions, we put relatively more weight on the targets coming from the distributions than the one for k. 19 Further, in the context of our model it is not meaningful to target δ, since it plays the double role of the worker's exit rate and the exit rate of existing matches, which are quite different numbers in the data. 20 For λ and µ there are no direct targets available.
17 Above 97% of the transitions from unemployment to employment in our dataset correspond to spells shorter than one year. 18 We average over 4 weeks since in the data we only know that a worker of duration τ has found a job within the current month, i.e. not necessarily in the current week. The normalization (by the wage for τ = 1) is necessary to be able to make a comparison to the data, since we normalized productivity y h . 19 A detailed description of the computational procedure is contained in the Code-Supplement, available online at http://home.bi.no/a0810303. 20 Our calibration furthermore suggests that k and α (which includes δ) cannot be separately identified, only the ratio k/α. Intuitively, both k and 1/α linearly determine the profitability of a match and thereby the shape of the We slightly overestimate the vacancy cost k = 1.06, for which the target is 0.94. Although we have not directly targeted b the value of 0.43 is within the range of the values in Shimer (2005b) , which is 40% of average wages (corresponding to 0.24 in our calibration), and the one in Hall and Milgrom (2008) , which is 71% of worker productivity. 
Quantitatively Assessing Ranking
The empirical literature has identified both sorting and ranking as two principal driving sources behind the negative duration dependence of hazard rates. See Machin and Manning (1999) for a survey. Many attempts have been made to quantitatively assess the relative importance of each of these sources, particularly because they lead to distinct policy recommendations. Our model is suitable for quantitatively assessing the relative importance of ranking strategies based on stigma.
distributions through the mass of entrants. We do so by comparing the extended version of the benchmark economy described in the previous section with a different one in which stigma is ruled out. More specifically, and for comparability purposes, we limit the changes to restricting the strategy space of firms regarding the use of ranking strategies. That is, firms can only discriminated against candidates who failed their own test, having to randomize among applicants otherwise, but can still condition wages on expected productivity.
Since the only change in the environment is in the selection rule, we only provide here the details of the matching probabilities. Let q ≡ τ ≥1 q τ stand for the expected queue length of all workers who succeeded at the test, whereas q l denotes the counterpart of those who failed the test.
Then, the job-finding probability conditional on passing the test is 21
Given that the probability does not depend on the type of the candidates, we remove the subindex 21 Although this probability formula may be intuitive, it can be formally derived as follows. Since the probability distribution that rules the arrival of applications of any type is Poisson, a firm hires a type τ worker with probability
where ms denotes the number of applications received from type s workers, and the first term after the sum symbol stands for the randomization strategy in the selection process. Again, the conditional job-finding probability must satisfy ντ (q T ) = ητ (q T )/qτ . We use (22) to obtain a similar expression for ντ . By manipulating conveniently the subindices, we obtain that ν ≡ ντ = ν τ for all τ, τ . Then, from ητ (q
hereafter. Likewise, workers who fail the test become employed with probability
The hazard rate is then h τ (u, q, q l ) = p τ (u)ν(q) + (1 − p τ (u))ν l (q, q l ). Therefore, once stigma-based ranking schemes are shut down, ex-ante heterogeneity is the sole mechanism providing negative duration dependence in hazard rates. A firm fills the vacancy with a type τ worker who did and did not passed the test with respective probabilities
There is no significant difference in the definition of the recursive equilibrium; hence, we do not repeat it here. Given the vector (u, (U τ ) τ ), we can rewrite the firm's problem (14) as
where I τ denotes an indicator function, which values 1 if the continuation value at duration τ is strictly lower than w l α, and 0 otherwise. It is easy to show that problem (25) is indeed equivalent to the following program
s. to τ r τ = 1 where r τ stands for the ratio q τ /q, and
That is, the firm allocates a positive weight to r τ if the associated M τ value is the maximum. We can also think of it as firms choosing between potentially T submarkets to post their vacancies.
Optimality requires that no firm posts its vacancy in a submarket such that the expected profits are below the maximum. We can then show that there exists a segmented markets equilibrium. Because the submarkets are linked by means of the continuation values of unemployment, we proceed backwards to solve for the equilibrium computationally. That is, we first solve the submarket of duration T to use the market value for this type in the submarket for duration T − 1.
Figures ?? and ?? compare the hazard rate and entry wage distributions of the extended benchmark with their counterparts in the no-ranking economy, respectively. As Figure ? ? shows, the hazard rates increase after approximately 30 weeks. This outcome is due to the assumption that y l > b. The expected market productivity gap between the applicants who pass and do not pass the test falls down with unemployment duration. In contrast to the benchmark, the test-failing workers are also employable in this economy. The equilibrium wages of the applicants successful at the test still reward their marginal value relative to the one of the workers who failed. That is, their marginal value squeezes as duration increases, and the gap turns upside down whenever the expected productivities are sufficiently close to one another: w l > w τ from a certain duration onwards. Since firms still prioritize them they make larger profits; hence, the q ratio falls with duration because firm's entry is relatively larger. Furthermore, job-seekers accept relatively lower wage offers as their unemployment duration gets closer to T leading to a relatively larger entry of firms at those submarkets towards T .
An economy with only ex-ante heterogeneity delivers over two thirds of the hazard rate decline at all durations. This outcome is consistent with a number of empirical analysis. Using CPS data for the 1967 period, van den Berg and van Ours (1996 estimate that negative duration dependence in hazard rates is mostly due to sorting for all demographic groups, but for white males.
Using macroeconomic data, van den Berg and van Ours (1994) obtain similar result for French and Dutch workers, and find individual duration dependence for British males. Limiting the analysis to administrative data of French young workers aged below 25, van den Berg and van Ours (1999) find that unobserved heterogeneity is significant for all gender groups, whereas individual duration dependence is not significant for young males during the first year of unemployment.
As expected, the exit rates from unemployment to employment are larger at all durations as well. This is because of the absence of the discriminating recruiting strategies against candidates with long spells. The flip side of this outcome is that the expected productivity falls more rapidly with unemployment duration because the dynamic sorting is more severe. This effect thus translates into entry wages, which would fall by 75% in the absence of stigma, instead of only 20%.
[To be completed]
Conclusions
The reemployment and wage prospects of job-seekers deteriorate over time. The macroeconomic models that deal with ex-ante heterogeneity of workers have failed to deliver this joint declining outcome. We set a directed search model where ex-ante heterogeneity, firms' non-sequential search and the optimal behavior of the agents generate rational stigma. This paper tackles the relative importance of stigma-based ranking recruiting strategies of firms in the determination of the negative duration effect of those two variables. We conclude that ex-ante heterogeneity is responsible for over two thirds of the hazard rate fall, but also for the limited wage decline.
[ changes that prevent us from tracing individuals over time. This is a rich microeconomic dataset for the analysis of transitions from unemployment to employment as well as entry wages, and their sensitivity on unemployment duration, which is reported in weeks.
We limit our sample to individuals aged 20 to 30 who report being unemployed in the previous month. Individuals reporting either not to be actively searching for a job or expecting a recall in the previous month are excluded as their employment prospects are likely to differ from the regular unemployed job-seekers. 22 Furthermore, farming-, army-and public-administration-related (un)employment are removed from the pool. We also discard unemployment spells longer than one year. Finally, imputed observations for earnings are excluded, i.e. only reported earnings are considered (see the discussion of allocated earnings below). These filters leave us with 19165 observations of hazard rates and 3787 of hourly wages. To keep track of individuals over two 22 Katz and Meyer (1990) show how job-search effort depends on recall expectations and estimate the mean weekly income loss at 14.44% upon a job switch, and at 5.73% after a recall.
consecutive months, we use the household identifier, person line number, and month-in-sample, and check for consistency by comparing sex, race and age variables across months. We use the outgoing rotation group weights.
We follow closely Addison, Portugal, and Centeno's (2004) economic approach hereafter.
Hazard Rates. A probit specification is used to estimate the empirical hazard rate. The set of regressors is formed by a yearly time variable, a quartic polynomial of imputed experience, along with monthly, sex, race, marital status, industry, occupation, state and education dummies. 23 In addition, we have a quartic polynomial in unemployment duration.
Hourly Wages. In 1994 a major redesign of the CPS took place concerning both question wording and data processing, which particularly affected the earnings variable (see US-Census-Bureau (2006) and Polivka (1996) ). These changes make it difficult to compare hours worked and hourly wage before and after 1994, and mostly motivate our choice of the time period. Prior to this methodological change, individuals were asked to report their earnings on a weekly basis, including overtime, tips, and commissions. In addition, they were asked to report their usual working hours at all jobs. After 1994, interviewees were allowed to report their earnings at an hourly basis, being labeled hourly workers. 24 Such workers report their hourly rate at their main job, excluding overtime, tips, and commissions. These extra payments may be also reported at the weekly basis.
Remaining interviewees report total earnings (including extra payments), which are converted to weekly rates.
We focus on the hourly wage of hourly workers at their main job. This may have some caveats, particularly if there is a selection effect from excluding non-hourly workers, or if the extra-payments are a substantial component of earnings. An alternative is to analyze weekly earnings (extra payments included) divided by usual hours (see Schmitt (2003) for a discussion). There are, however, some reasons in favor of our procedure: First, the ratio of hourly to non-hourly workers is approximately six, and, for hourly workers, weekly earnings obtain from multiplying the hourly wage and the usual number of working hours (adding the overtime, tips and commissions, if reported). There 23 A dummy to control for the potential effects of unemployment benefits exhaustion at the 26th week is included, although turns out not to be statistically significant. For the experience imputation, we follow Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2008) and Jaeger (1997) and estimate it by subtracting schooling years from the workers' age.
24 To be precise, those individuals who prefer to report on a non-hourly basis, but declare to be paid hourly are also labeled as hourly workers.
are very few observations with extra payment for hourly workers. Second, as opposed to working time at all jobs, since 1994 usual working time at the main job has been directly addressed, and double checked. Further, hours vary was introduced as a new answer in the working time question.
Imputation strategies may be undertaken given that such a response accounts for just 6 to 7% of the total employment (see Schmitt (2003) ). However, the percentage rises to over 12% in our subsample of newly employed. Further, Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) emphasize the problem of workers' over-reporting their working time.
There are some common issues related to processing the earnings data. Regarding trimming,
i.e. how to best deal with implausibly high hourly wages, we follow Schmitt (2003) and keep only hourly rates between $1 and $100. Less than 0.2% of our weekly earnings observations are topcoded, which suggests that our filter is likely to be costless. Another potential issue is the allocated earnings. BLS uses the cell hot decking procedure to impute earnings to those missing responses. 25 .
The allocated responses account for over 30% of the outgoing rotation group after 1994, and about 24% in our subsample of newly employed workers under 30. 26 We have performed the analysis excluding those imputed earnings.
Regarding the econometric approach, there are issues that deserve attention. First, there is a sample selection issue if only the observations related to newly employed workers are considered.
Second, entry wages and unemployment duration are simultaneously determined. Then, we adopt a 2SLS log-linear specification after deflating wages by US city average CPI-U. In the Mincerian log wage regression, we add, to the set of regressors used for the analysis of hazard rates, unionmembership and full time job dummies as well and now we treat the unemployment duration variable as endogenous. We instrument the unemployment duration by a number of variables, such as household size, the metropolitan area size, the country of birth, the job-finding methods, the reason to leave the last job or the reason for unemployment.
25 According to the US-Census-Bureau, the weekly earnings hot deck is defined by age, race, sex, usual hours, occupation, and educational attainment. 26 For methodological reasons, there are no imputed earnings from January 1994 to August 1995.
Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 After some manipulations and substituting out the wages from the complementary slackness conditions (9), the firm's problem (14) can be rewritten as
where ∆ τ ≡ αȳ τ (u) − b − β(1 − δ)U τ +1 . If a sufficiently low wage w τ for some τ is offered, then q τ = 0 and the firm derives no positive profits from type τ applicants.
First, the profit functions is clearly continuous in q T . The set of plausible vectors q T can be restricted to a compact set since they must be positive and firms cannot make negative profits for any duration τ . Therefore, there exists a solution. Now, we show that the solution of the firm's problem is unique, and is characterized by the first order conditions. The Hessian of function F is D 2 F = (h ij ) i,j , where for any given pair (i, j), with i ≤ j,
To show that q τ > 0 for all τ , let us suppose there exists at least one type of workers such that its associated queue is 0. Without loss of generality, let us refer to τ 0 as the first type for which the queue length is 0 assuming that all queues associated to longer durations are also 0. Then, the market value of that worker must be bα. Let w be the profit-maximizing contract. Consider now the alternative contract w that stipulates the same wages as w, but offers type τ 0 workers a wage b + for a positive, but sufficiently small . Because of the ranking strategies, the type τ 0 workers do not crowd out the candidates with higher expected productivities and imply expected positive profits for the firm. Therefore, the alternative contract delivers strictly higher profits than w. Therefore, w cannot be profit-maximizing.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let f : K → K be defined as the composite correspondence f ≡ φ • ψ, with ψ and φ be defined as in Section 3.4. We need to show that f is a continuous function defined on a compact set K ⊂ 3×T . Then, Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem applies to ensure the existence of a fixed point of function f .
Let us first define the set K.
In words, K is the nonempty set of pairs formed by worker distributions in the two dimensional duration-productivity space and today's expectations on tomorrow's unemployment market value.
The first defining constraint ensures that the equilibrium is characterized by a declining expected productivity over time, whereas the second can be rewritten as ∆ τ ≥ ∆ τ +1 . Obviously, the set in question is compact.
We turn now to show that ψ(z) is a continuous function. Let z ∈ K. Then, ψ(z) is defined by the solution set of the following system: q τ = q 1 α(τ ), for all τ < T (28)
where α(τ ) = u h (τ )+u l (τ )λ µ+(1−µ)λ . Condition (30) obtains from rearranging terms in the zero-profit condition by using the FOC of the firms' maximization problem, whereas the remaining equations are the resource constraints (13).
We now prove that the solution set is singleton. For that, the variables q τ , for τ ∈ {2, ..., T − 1}, are replaced out from the last condition imposing the relationships determined by (28). It remains a two equation system with two unknowns q 1 and q T . Whereas equation (29) 
From what it follows
dq T dq 1 < 0 in K as the second defining restriction implies that the first term of the right hand side is negative. Hence ψ is a function on K. Indeed, it is a continuous one. Since φ is obviously a continuous function, so is the composite f .
Finally, equilibrium conditions (16) and (17) obtain directly from the FOC of the firms' problem and the complementary slackness conditions (9).
Proof of Lemma 3.3
We refer to the event of a worker having passed the test as T . Let P (i|τ, T ) denote the probability that a worker of age τ is of type i conditional on the event T . We need to show that P (h|τ, T ) is decreasing in τ . By using Bayes' rule, P (h|τ, T ) > P (h|τ + 1, T ) ⇔ P (h)P (τ, T |h) P (h)P (τ, T |h) + (1 − P (h))P (τ, T |l) > P (h)P (τ + 1, T |h) P (h)P (τ + 1, T |h) + (1 − P (h))P (τ + 1, T |l) Now, after some manipulations, this inequality holds if and only if P (τ |l) P (τ |h) < P (τ + 1|l) P (τ + 1|h) = P (τ |l)(1 − λ l + λ l P (τ + 1|τ )) P (τ |h)(1 − λ h + λ h P (τ + 1|τ )) ⇔ λ h > λ l where P (τ + 1|τ ) stands for the probability of staying unemployed one more period conditional on passing the test. Thus, the expected productivity y τ falls with τ provided that type l workers are less successful in passing the test than their type h counterparts.
The proof of declining values J τ (w) follows closely Shimer (2005) . So, it is omitted.
